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THE ROLE OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS IN TODAY'S
COMPETITIVE GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
Burton D. Garland, Jr. and Reuven R. Levary*
I. INTRODUCTION
American antitrust laws have made a significant contribution to the
performance of the United States economy, and until recently, have served this
country well. American antitrust laws were originally enacted during the
Industrial Revolution (beginning in the late 1800's) when their primary
function was to protect consumers from the effects of monopoly, oligopoly,
and cartel behavior. Without such laws, firms possessing such characteristics
were able to control the price and quantity of available goods. Additionally,
these laws sought to protect the labor force from monopolists and oligopolists.
Thus, the two primary goals of American antitrust laws are the promotion
of competitive conduct and consumer welfare.' These goals are achieved
through allocating and using resources efficiently, developing new and
improved technology, and introducing new production, distribution, and
organizational techniques in order to allocate economic resources to their most
beneficial uses.2
Historically, American antitrust law has sought to promote competitive
conduct and consumer welfare by protecting trade and commerce from
unlawful restraints, price discrimination, price fixing, and monopolistic or
oligopolistic behavior. The Sherman Antitrust Act, the first American antitrust
law, was based on the constitutional right granted to Congress to regulate
interstate commerce. Specifically, the Act regulated trusts by prohibiting any
industrial combination in restraint of trade or commerce. Nevertheless, this
Act has never been vigorously enforced because it failed to adequately define
the terms "trust," "combination," and "restraints."
In 1914, in an effort to strengthen the Sherman Antitrust Act, Congress
passed the Clayton Antitrust Act. This Act prohibited corporate practices such
as price discrimination, interlocking directorates, tying contracts, and stock
ownership in competitive firms. In the late 1930's, there was a dramatic
resurgence in antitrust action. However, these antitrust laws, which are now
* Department of Management and Decision Sciences, St. Louis University.
Thomas J. Schoenbaum, The International Trade Laws and the New Protectionionism: The
Need for a Synthesis with Antitrust, 19 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 393, n.6 (1994).
2 Id.
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quite old, were developed in an era where foreign competition was, for the
most part, nonexistent.
Antitrust laws "were created to regulate a domestic market in which
foreign goods played a comparatively minor role."3 Today, in contrast, the
United States market is filled with foreign produced goods, and participants
in the United States market frequently compete on a global scale. American
corporations, once dominant in the global marketplace, now face strong
competition from huge multinational corporations based in Europe and the
Pacific-Rim.4 This situation is vastly different from the period between 1945
and 1970, when the United States was the world's dominant technological
leader.5 Many observers predict that the level of international competition will
continue to expand upon entering the twenty-first century.6
There are numerous reasons for this increased level of global competition.
Such factors as the "improvement in transportation and communication, the
demolition of many tariff and non-tariff barriers, an evolving commonalty of
consumer consumption patterns," and the emergence of "trade blocks have
transformed the system of balkanized local markets into a global arena."7 The
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the latest General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) will undoubtedly accelerate this
trend, as will the evolving European Economic Community (EEC).
The internationalization of markets has changed the process of
competition and has made the fundamental assumptions, upon which antitrust
laws have been based, obsolete. The antitrust laws which served this country
well during the Industrial Revolution are now impeding American
competitiveness in the global marketplace. As a result, a critical evaluation of
United States antitrust laws and their effect on the ability of American
companies to compete in the global marketplace is warranted.
3 See generally, David J. Gerber, Symposium on Antitrust Law and the Internationalization of
Markets: Forward: Antitrust and the Challenge of Internationalization, 64 CI.-KENT L. REV. 689 (1988).
4 Robert A. Katzman, The Attenuation of Antitrust, 2 BROOKINGS REv. 23, 26 (1984).
5 See Thomas M. Jorde and David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation And Antitrust. Balancing
Competition and Cooperation, 4 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 33 (1989).
6 Michael N. Sohn, Failing and Flailing Firms: Merger Analysis in a Time of Recession,
Changing Technology and International Competition, 795 PL/CROP 147, 149-50 (1992).
See A. Paul Victor, Antitrust and International Competitiveness in the 1990's, 58 ANTrrRUST
L.J. 515 (1989).
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H. NATURE AND SCOPE OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAWS
In order to properly analyze the effect of United States antitrust laws on
the ability of American companies to compete in the global marketplace, a
brief overview of the nature and scope of the principal substantive antitrust
laws is required. American antitrust laws were originally enacted to prevent
both monopolies and oligopolies from forming, and to eliminate anti-
competitive conduct in situations where natural monopolies and oligopolies
exist. In other words, these laws seek to prevent conduct which has the effect
of eliminating economic competition, actual or potential, among business
firms.' There are basically four ways in which such competition may be
eliminated.9
First, competition may be eliminated as a necessary consequence of
mergers, acquisitions, and joint ventures which involve the complete
integration of two or more previously independent firms.'° Current case law
recognizes that either a positive effect, a negative effect, or no effect on the
overall level of competition in the relevant markets may occur as the result of
a merger."
Second, the elimination of competition may also be a logical consequence
of a limited joint venture. 2 Frequently, joint ventures are formed for the
purpose of conducting research and development which may also eliminate
some or all competition.13 Furthermore, a parent corporation may covenant not
to compete directly with its joint venture, or a joint venture's parent company
may covenant not to compete with other parent companies of the joint
venture.14
Third, competition may be eliminated as a consequence of cartel activity. 5
Cartel activity results when many leading firms in a particular industry
coordinate their economic activity through price-fixing, output limitation,
8 Global Competition: The New Reality, 1985 Report of the President's Commission on
Industrial Competitiveness.
9 Ronald W. Davis, Antitrust, the Trade Deficit, and U.S. International Competitiveness: A Time
for Rethinking, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &PoL. 1235, 1251 (1986).
10 Id.
" Id. at 1242.
12 Id.




customer allocation, or market allocation with the principal objective of
achieving higher-than-competitive profit levels. 6
Fourth, competition may be eliminated as a result of predatory pricing or
of monopolistic and oligopolistic conduct. 7 In this case, in order to adversely
affect smaller and less powerful competitors by driving them out of the
market, the dominant firm or firms in an industry, who have substantial market
power, covenant to reduce and fix prices at levels which the smaller
competitors cannot match.
M. INTERNATIONALIZATION OF MARKETS AND
COMPETITION
The internationalization of markets has had a dramatic impact on the
United States. There are four primary aspects of the internationalization
process: the increasing demand for foreign goods by American consumers; the
decisions of foreign competitors to meet those demands; the characteristics
required of firms engaged in international competition; and the increased
importance of government antitrust policies."
A. Satisfaction of Domestic Demand by Foreign Corporations
To the American consumer, this internationalization of markets is, for the
most part, marked by an increase in imported goods available for sale. 9 These
may be "sourcing decisions" by domestic firms (e.g., the decision by a United
States automotive manufacturer to produce components in Brazil).2° "[It] may
also be decisions by foreign firms either to produce for the United States
market or purchase for resale in that market."'" The variety and quantity of




is See Gerber, supra note 3 at 689.
19 See Economic Report of the President Transmitted to Congress, 24 WEEKLY COMP. PRESS DOC.
224 (Feb. 19, 1988)(Explaining statistics concerning imports from 1978 to 1987, categorized by country).
2 See Chrysler Move in Brazil, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 1986, at D2.
21 See supra note 17.
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B. Competitive Decision Making
Another factor of international competition is the increased importance of
competitive decision making. Competitive decision making has led to the
increased presence of imported goods in marketplaces within the United
States. These decisions are influenced by the economic, political, and legal
factors of the nations in which those foreign firms are based.22 As of late,
foreign competitors are satisfying the increased demands of domestic
consumers with little regard for sovereign national boundaries.23
Firms that choose to enter the American market must maintain a degree
of sensitivity to the different political, cultural, and economic nuances of
America.u These international fims have developed the ability to bring these
elements into their competitive decision making process.25 As a result, many
of these firms (e.g., Honda, B.M.W., and Sony) have enjoyed dramatic success
in the American marketplace.
C. Economies of Scale
American antitrust laws restrict American companies from achieving the
size necessary to compete with their unrestricted foreign competitors. Many
critics of antitrust believe that firms must achieve aggrandize to achieve a
level of efficiency sufficient for international competition.26 Professor Joseph
L. Bower of the Harvard Business School believes that if American
corporations are to survive global competition they "[n]eed the low operating
costs of large scale operations and the resources for continual development."'
These resources provide firms with the ability to rapidly shift production from
one country to another in response to the dynamic global market.
22 See, e.g., EMuIo PAGOULATOS & ROBERT SORENSEN, Industrial Policy and Firm Behavior in
an International Context, in WESTERN ECONOMIES IN TRANSITION 305 (J. Levenson & J. Wheeler eds.
1980); Lester Thurow, Revitalizing American Industry: Managing in a Competitive World Economy, 27
CAL. MGMT. REv. 9 (1984).
23 See Gerber, supra note 3 at 689.
24 See supra note 3.
25 ROBERT REICH, THE NEXT AMERICAN FRONTIER, (New York Times Book Co., 1983).
26 See, e.g., Janus AK. Ordover, Transitional Antitrust and Economics, In Antitrust and Trade
Policy in International Trade 233, 234-35 (Fordham Corp. Law Institute 1985).
27 Joseph L Bower, Revising Antitrust Laws: The Case For Building More IBM's, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 16, 1986 § 3.
BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
D. Increased Importance of Government Antitrust Policies
Under international law, all nations are sovereign, such that all nations
have the power to make treaties and agreements with other nations, as well as
impose tariffs, taxes, and regulate trade at its borders. Thus, the governments
of countries in which foreign firms seek to compete have a great deal of
influence over those firms.
In contrast, the United States, for the most part, has an open border
policy.2" This policy allows inexpensive, well made foreign goods into the
domestic marketplace. At the same time, the United States has antitrust laws
that prohibit its own American corporate entities from developing many of the
characteristics necessary to successfully compete with international firms.
Those laws prevent these firms from being able to achieve sufficient
economies of scale necessary to compete in the global marketplace.29 This
illustrates the importance of governmental influence over international
competition.
IV. THE DIMINISHING NEED FOR ANTITRUST LAWS
The prevailing view among proponents of strict antitrust laws is that in
noncompetitive markets, incentives to achieve efficiency and to invest in
technology furthering research and development will diminish as a result of
monopolistic or oligopolistic behavior.3" Judge Learned Hand, in an antitrust
monopoly case almost fifty years ago, propounded:
[P]ossession of unchallenged economic power deadens initiative,
discourages thrift, and depresses energy; that immunity from
competition is a narcotic, and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial
progress; that the spur of constant stress is necessary to counteract an
inevitable disposition to let well enough alone.31
23 Id.
29 Ira M Millstein, Essay: The Impact of the Antitrust Laws on America's Ability to Restructure
Its Industries and Proposals for Change, 47 U. Prr. L. REV. 713, (1986).
30 Robert Pitofsky, Proposals for Revised United States Merger Enforcement in a Global
Economy, 81 GEO. L. J. 195 (1992).
31 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
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Judge Hand's eloquent analysis, which was part of an opinion rendered in
1945 when the American market was basically devoid of foreign competition,
applies only to noncompetitive markets. As a result, although the possibility
exists that anti-competitive conduct may result from eliminating or reworking
the antitrust laws, in most market situations, monopolistic or oligopolistic
conduct does not occur. Moreover, in today's competitive global environment,
monopolistic or ologopolistic conduct does not pose a significant threat to
competition.
As a result, United States antitrust laws, in their current form, have
become obsolete. Professor Lester C. Thurow believes that "the time has come
to recognize that the techniques of the nineteenth century are not applicable
in getting ready for the twenty-first century."32 Professor Thurow goes on to
comment:
No one knows why dinosaurs became extinct, but it was probably
some change in the environment combined with an animal that had
become too large and too highly specialized. The dinosaur was also
famous for having very little brain to body weight and did not change
its habits easily. Antitrust suffers from all of these problems.33
In the past couple of decades, a massive change in the economic
environment has occurred. The United States has never had to face
competitors that are its financial and technological equals. Even some of
American largest corporations have teetered on the brink of financial ruin in
the face of this increased level of international competition.34 The American
automobile industry is a prime example of this situation.3
Since its inception, the American automobile industry has remained one
of the most concentrated of all major United States industries.36 In the post-
World War 11 era, the "Big Three," General Motors, Ford, and Chrysler have
generally accounted for a minimum of ninety percent of the United States
32 Lester Thurow, A New Era of Competition, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 18, 1982 at 63.
33 Id.
Ronald W. Davis, Antitrust, the Trade Deficit, and U.S. International Competitiveness: A Time
for Rethinking, 18 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. &PoL. 1235, 1241 (1986).
35 Id.
3 See Walter Adams & James W. Brock, Joint Ventures, Antitrust, and Transnational
Cartelization, 11 J. INT'L. L. Bus. 433, 456 (1991).
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automobile production.37 Until recently, they controlled an approximately
equal share of United States Automobile sales.3"
The late Malcolm Forbes observed that the American automobile industry
was a one-sided oligopoly, with Ford and Chrysler surviving, but on G.M.'s
terms.39 In Thurow's words:
Predictably, the industry exhibited the unmistakable traits of
oligopolistic mutual interdependence and competitive forbearance:
prices that were uniformly rigid except in the upward direction, price
competition nonexistent, production inefficiency and bureaucratic red
tape rampant, and technological progress moribund.'
The introduction of foreign competition in the 1970's, particularly the
Japanese automobiles which were innovative and fuel-efficient, disrupted this
noncompetitive arrangement.4" The industry's initial response to this new
foreign competition was to join with organized labor to lobby government for
the imposition of "voluntary" import quotas.42 Thus, rather than adjust to
foreign competition, the domestic oligopoly sought to restrict them from the
American market.43 The industry created political pressure which resulted in
"voluntary" quotas which imposed quantitative restrictions on Japanese
imports.'
Despite the imposition of these "voluntary" quotas, the United States' auto
industry has gone through (and perhaps is finally nearing the end of) an
industry-wide shakedown. The quotas allowed the American car manu-
facturers to enjoy temporary success while their Japanese counterparts
methodically chipped away at the American car manufacturers market share.
At least one antitrust critic has commented that "even if General Motors were
the only domestic automobile manufacturer, it would still be in a competitive
fight for its life. '45 In a world of global markets and ever increasing trade,
37 Id.
39 Id.
39 Jerry Flint, Best Car Wins, FORBEs, Jan 27, 1986, at 73, 75-76.
40 ADAMS & BROCK, THE AUTOMOBILE INDUSTRY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN INDUSTRY
1 (W. Adams 7th ed. 1986) (discussing the structure of the U.S. auto industry).
41 Abolish the Antitrust Laws, DUN'S REv., Feb. 1981, at 72 (Interviewing top economist Lester
Thurow).
42 Id.
43 See ORDOVER supra note 26.
4 See ADAMS & BROCK supra note 40.
45 See ABOUSH THE ANTITRUST LAws, supra note 41, at 72.
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restraints such as quotas, tariffs, and other import restraints, whether voluntary
or not, are only temporary remedies which may provide some relief, but are
not permanent solutions.46
V. OBSOLESCENCE OF THE FUNDAMENTAL ASSUMPTIONS
OF ANTITRUST LAW
Concepts that successfully achieved particular goals in a domestic context
are less effective in achieving their goals in an international context. 7 Anti-
trust concepts assume particular relationships between cause and effect. Inter-
national competition, however, alters these causal relationships, and hence,
also alters the outcomes resulting from the application of these legal con-
cepts. 8
Specifically, in merger cases, current antitrust law requires courts to mea-
sure economic power of the merged entity.49 Courts must determine economic
power in relation to the entity's supply potential and size of the market in
which the merged entity will operate. Assessing the supply potential and
defining markets is extremely difficult, even in purely domestic market
contexts. °
The internationalization of competition increases the difficulties inherent
in determining market size and power. The fundamental causal relationships
between supply potential and market definition to anti-competitive behavior
is markedly different in an international context than in a purely domestic
context. Regardless, American courts will find that mergers of any kind are
illegal if they have a sufficiently high probability of creating anti-competitive
effects within the United States. 1
4 See BOWER, supra note 28.
47 See Gerber, supra note 3, at 689.
Id.
49 See, e.g., Robert J. Harris &Thomas M. Jorde, Antitrust Market Definition: An Integrated
Approach, 72 CA. L. REv. 3 (1984); White, Antitrust and Merger Policy: A Review and Critique, 1 J.
ECON. PRESP., 13, 14-16 (1987).
50 Id.
51 See, e.g., U.S. Dep't. of Just., Antitrust Div., Antitrust Guide for Int'l Operations (1977),
reprinted in 799 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. (BNA) E-1, E-3 to E-6 (Feb. 1, 1977).
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A. Antitrust Law and Organizational Size
A view that has emerged over the last two decades is that if American
firms are to successfully compete in world markets, "they must be free to
restructure their operations to take advantage of opportunities to increase their
efficiency and respond rapidly to changing market conditions and
technology."52 As a result, these critics argue that American companies must
be allowed to increase their organizational size in order to have any chance of
successfully competing in the international marketplace. Nevertheless, as it
stands now, many "American industries now compete in global markets but
are shackled by outmoded, unduly restrictive antitrust laws"53 prohibiting
them from attaining the requisite size and efficiency to successfully compete
against huge multinational and government backed foreign firms.
B. Antitrust Law and Supply Potential
Another problem with current antitrust analysis is the issue of supply
potential.5 4 When corporations compete either exclusively or predominately
in a limited geographic area, such as that created by national boundaries, the
issue of supply potential tends to be relatively unproblematic because
competing firms cannot rapidly and conveniently shift the supply of its
products." In order to rapidly shift supply to meet changing demand, these
firms would either have to invest in new production facilities or retool existing
facilities.
Firms competing on an international scale, however, may be able to alter
their supply of product to fill increasing demand in a particular geographic
area merely by shifting the flow of existing production.56 In other words,
shifting supply would not entail the building of new productions facilities or
the retooling of old ones. "The ease with which product flows can be
manipulated thus increases the difficulty of defining markets, assessing the
power of firms within those markets, and adjudging the influence of potential
52 Statement by Attorney General Edwin Meese m accompanying Administration's Antitrust
Reform Package 1 (Feb. 19, 1986).
53 MERGER MODERNI7ATION ACT OF 1986, 132 CONG. REC. 22 (1986); See H.R. 4247, 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1986).
54 See Gerber, supra note 47.
55 Id.
56 Id.
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foreign competition on domestic competitive relationships."57 As a result, a
concept that works, at best, tolerably well in a domestic market, functions
even less well in an international context.
C. Antitrust Law and Market Definition
American courts have for some time recognized that a particular merger
may have a positive effect in a large and broadly defined market while at the
same time injuring competition in a narrowly defined market. Under current
antitrust analysis, the courts look to see how much domestic market share is
controlled by one firm. 58 However, what seems large relative to the United
States is not large when considered in the context of the world economy.59
This is even more problematic when it is recognized that the foreign firms are
often government owned, backed by state banking, or controlled by larger
combines.'
Nevertheless, current case law instructs courts to disregard any productive
efficiencies that might result from a merger and to consider only the likely
effects of the merger on domestic competition. Specifically, if a merger results
in increased market power in the United States, a court, in an antitrust action,
may not consider, as a possible justification or defense to the merger, the
likelihood that the merged entity will be better able to compete in the global
economy. 61 It is irrelevant whether the firm could achieve the necessary
economies to successfully compete in the global market. Even if the merger
allows for the gain of sales from foreign rivals with consequent benefit to the
United States, and the corporation in particular, American courts may not
allow this information to influence its decisions.62
This illustrates the antiquated thinking inherent in current antitrust law.
The current antitrust thinking, which ignores world markets and whose
inherent belief that American companies are big enough and strong enough to
succeed on their own, no longer holds true. This jurisprudence, which
prohibits courts from considering the enhanced competitiveness in
international markets as a possible defense in the case of mergers producing




60 See Davis, supra note 9 at 1241.
61 d.at 1240.
62 Id. at 1261.
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Today, the survival of many American corporations, and even whole
industries, may depend on the ability to succeed in the international
marketplace.
For instance, Boeing Corporation and McDonnell Douglas have witnessed
sales and market share of the passenger aircraft industry disappear to the
government backed European Airbus Corporation. Due to government
support, Airbus is able to let its customers finance their purchases over
extended time periods, thereby reducing the amount of current capital needed
to purchase new aircraft. American companies like McDonnell-Douglas and
Boeing have lost out on sales because of their inability to match Airbus'
attractive financing. As a result, situations such as this have led many political
leaders to call for the restructuring of American antitrust laws.63
VI. THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN ANTITRUST LAW IN THE
GLOBAL MARKETPLACE
Previously, ensuring the success of American businesses in the
international marketplace had not been the goal of American antitrust law.
Now, however, many argue that the internationalization of markets requires
larger and more cooperative domestic firms in order to meet foreign
competition. 6'
Former Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldridge believes that the
circumstances which originally brought about the antitrust laws, in particular
the Clayton act, "really no longer exist," and that "with global markets as
competitive as they are now, any barriers to United States companies' ability
to compete should be examined very seriously."65 Baldridge and many other
influential political figures believe that by changing antitrust laws, United
States companies would have substantially more latitude to merge and take
advantage of economies of scale. 66 Baldridge observed:
[T]he United States' most conspicuous failure to identify and remove
economically counter-productive laws is in the area of antitrust. It is
not just that some parts of those laws are irrelevant today; it is in the
63 Baldndge Proposes Repeal ofAntitrust Language, Olmer Japan Trip is Canceled, INT'L. TRADE
REP. (BNA) Vol.2, at 284 (Feb. 27, 1985).
64 See ORDOVER. supra note 26.
65 See Baldridge Proposes Repeal of Antitrust Language, Olmer Japan Trip is Canceled, supra
note 63.
66 ld. at 284.
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fact that those laws place additional and unnecessary burdens on the
ability of United States firms to compete.67
Baldridge and other critics have demanded a reassessment of the entire
American antitrust structure, and its underlying rationale, to determine the
cost those laws impose on the American economy in the international
marketplace. 8
Critics suggest, "antitrust laws should permit or even encourage firms to
acquire the characteristics thought to be necessary for success in this
competitive environment. ' 69 To accomplish this, courts must weigh
established antitrust goals against the need to protect and enhance the
international competitiveness of domestic firms.
Therefore, it must be determined how, if at all, courts should consider
international competitiveness when applying the antitrust laws.7' Currently,
antitrust law prevents judges from basing their decisions on goals such as
international competitiveness or production efficiency. These goals, it is
believed, are unrelated to the established goals of the antitrust laws.7'
In addition, United States antitrust laws suffer from a perceived vagueness
of the very goals of antitrust law.' In fact, many believe that the antitrust laws
provide little guidance for decision making.73 This perception has been center
stage during the last decade and a half.7 4
During that time, a controversy has developed between two opposing
schools of thought on antitrust goals.75 One group believes the purpose of
antitrust laws is to limit the concentration of economic power, ensure
economic opportunities for small competitors, and promote consumer welfare.
67 ABA Antitrust Section Examines Deregulation, Enforcement Shifts, 49 ANTrrRUST & TRADE
REG. REP. (BNA) 156, 160 (1985).
68 See Baldridge Proposes Repeal of Antitrust Language, Olmer Japan Trip is Canceled, supra
note 63.
See, Areeda, Monopolization, Mergers, and Markets: A Century Past and the Future, 75 CA.
L. REv. 951, 953, (1987).
70 Id.
71 Id.
72 See Gerber, supra note 3 at 689.
73 Id.
74 Id.
7 For discussion, see e.g., Elanor M. Fox, The Battle for the Soul of Antitrust, 75 CAL. L REV.
917 (1987); Elanor M. Fox & Lawerence A. Sullivan, Antitrust-Retrospective and Prospective: Where
Are We Coming From? Where Are We Going?, 62 N.Y.U. L REv. 936 (1987); Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust
in the Next 100 Years, 75 CAL. L. REV. 817 (1987); Donald F. Turner, The Durability, Relevance, and
Future of American Policy, 75 CAL. L REV. 797 (1987).
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The other group argues that economic efficiency, "as defined by neoclassical
economic theory, is the only legitimate goal of antitrust law."76
This controversy concerning the goals of antitrust adversely impacts
antitrust analysis in the context of international competition. What has
resulted is an increased receptiveness to antitrust theories, and the recognition
that something needs to be done to current antitrust law. Unfortunately, the
result often has been an unstructured weakening of antitrust law rather than
a careful evaluation of the impact of internationalization on antitrust law.77 A
structured analysis of the impact of the internationalization of competition on
antitrust goals may answer the question of whether antitrust laws should be
rewritten or possibly even eliminated altogether.
A careful analysis of current antitrust law and the impact of
internationalization calls for clarification of the goals sought to be achieved
by antitrust law. Such clarification would end the controversy which
undermines confidence in the antitrust laws. Since no system of legal norms
can function effectively without reasonably clear objectives,
"internationalization of markets, which has changed the operating
environment of antitrust laws, requires that the objectives of antitrust law be
made explicit."78
VII. CONCLUSION
There is a prevailing view among many economists, antitrust attorneys,
and business and legal scholars that the internationalization process reduces
or even eliminates the need for antitrust law. They argue that
internationalization generates competitive influences on conduct that has an
effect roughly equivalent to, or greater than, the effect sought to be achieved
by the imposition of antitrust laws. International competition creates
competitive pressures on firms operating in the United States market. As a
result, incentives to engage in anti-competitive behavior diminishes with the
increasing internationalization of markets.
Control of production facilities in many countries is believed to be
necessary for success in the global market. However, frequently, American
antitrust laws stand in the way of American companies achieving the
necessary size required to compete successfully in the world marketplace. In
76 See Gerber, supra note 3 at 694.
Id.
79 Id.
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effect "[American] antitrust laws have strait jacketed United States
manufacturers in international trade."79
In this age of global competition, the need to restrict the size of domestic
firms has disappeared. It no longer makes sense to impede American firms
with antitrust laws, when they must operate in an international competitive
environment8 Today, firms must be able to achieve the economies of scale
thought to be necessary for effective international competition.
The internationalization of competition thus has far-reaching implications
regarding the effectiveness of antitrust laws in achieving antitrust goals. This
impact requires the re-evaluation of the basic characteristics of the United
States antitrust law system. That system was developed in a competitive
context that was basically devoid of foreign competition. Now, however, the
environment in which the antitrust system must function has been, and
continues to be, fundamentally altered by the internationalization of
competition. Consequently, current antitrust laws and thinking must be
evaluated in light of the ever-increasing internationalization of markets to
determine whether they can achieve the goals for which they were originally
created.
A critical evaluation of the current system may reveal that the current
concepts of market definition and market power are obsolete, and hence,
ineffective. On the other hand, the critical evaluation may show that concepts
of economic power should play an even greater role in United States antitrust
law than they play today.
Regardless of the outcome, antitrust law, in its current form, impedes the
ability of American corporations to successfully compete in the global
marketplace. Whether there needs to be more effective regulation or no
regulation at all remains unclear. However, what is clear is that the state of
current antitrust law demands a critical reassessment in the context of
international competition.
79 To Establish a Commission on the International Application of Antitrust Laws: Hearings Before
the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 12 (1980) (statement of Sen.
Mathias).
0 The Joint Venture: Panel Discussion, 53 ANTrrRUST L.J. 97, 98 (1984).

